Articles Posted in Breach of Contract

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In a case that involved thousands of toxic tort liability cases, the Illinois Appellate Court has ruled that an industrial manufacturer must turn over documents it alleged were privileged to a company indemnifying it.

In March 1999, automotive systems manufacturer BorgWarner Inc. acquired Kuhlman Corp. and its subsidiaries, including Kuhlman Electric Corp (KEC).

Since the 1950s, KEC has operated a facility in Mississippi that produces electrical transformers. As part of the Kuhlman Corp. sale, KEC represented that there was no soil contamination on its Mississippi property.

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In a commodities fraud case, it was contended by the plaintiff, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), that previous versions of a defendant expert’s report should be produced and not be privileged because of communications between the lawyer and this expert witness.

In 2010, the work-product privilege provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(B) and (C) was extended to cover drafts of reports from experts with three exceptions. This privilege extends to communications between lawyers and experts.

The CFTC argued that the defendants “should be deemed to have forfeited Rule 26(b)(4)’s work-product protection because there is evidence that defendants’ counsel participated in drafting sections of the report.” The U.S. magistrate judge handling this U.S. District Court case rejected the CFTC’s forfeiture argument stating: “The CFTC’s approach would require an analysis of the degree of counsel involvement (both quantity and quality) in the drafting of the report. Such an analysis would necessarily require production of all of the drafts of the report for comparison, as well as production of all, or virtually all, communications between expert and counsel. The drafters intended Rule 26(b)(4)(B) and (C) to protect against that discovery.”

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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit in Chicago has reversed the decision of a U.S. District Court judge wherein an agreement between the parties, Hennessy Industries Inc. and National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, required arbitration of any dispute that mandated an interpretation of the agreement. In this case, Hennessy Industries manufactured car parts. Since the 1980s, Hennessy has been the named defendant in many lawsuits for asbestos-related personal-injury cases. Hennessy has been looking to National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh for insurance coverage for these claims. The two companies entered into a cost-sharing agreement in 2008.

When the lawsuits for asbestos-related injuries started coming in, Hennessy requested that National Union indemnify it for settlement and defense costs as provided for in their agreement. The two parties, however, could not come to an agreement as to what was owed. Hennessy demanded arbitration in line with the agreement, which provided for arbitration of disputes between the parties.

Hennessy filed suit in 2013 under 215 ILCS 5/155(1), maintaining that National Union’s delays in granting coverage of the asbestos claims had been vexatious and unreasonable.

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The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals in Chicago has affirmed the dismissal of a fraud case in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Patrick Camasta filed a lawsuit against Joseph A. Bank Clothiers Inc. claiming that prior to making purchases at the company’s far north suburban store in Deer Park, Ill., that he saw an advertisement about “sale prices” for certain items.

Camasta’s complaint did not specify when or where he saw the advertisement, what exactly the advertisement said, what the “sale prices” were or what particular merchandise was eligible for the sale.

At the Deer Park Joseph A. Bank store, Camasta found that there was a promotion in which customers were able to buy one shirt and get two for free. Camasta purchased six shirts for $167. After his purchases, Camasta alleged that he learned that Bank’s practice was to advertise normal retail prices as normal price reductions. Camasta alleged but for this fraudulent retail tactic, he would not have purchased the six shirts.

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In 1952, the owner of a parcel of land in Illinois granted a pipeline operator an easement for two pipelines to cross his land. The first pipeline was built immediately.

The easements specified that the second pipeline, if constructed, was required to be built within ten feet of the first pipeline. The pipeline operator promised the landowner that the land would remain farmable.

In 2012, the current pipeline operator notified the landowner that it planned to build the second pipeline. The owner responded with a lawsuit to quiet title. The pipeline operator removed the case to the federal district court under diversity jurisdiction.

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Fortunee Massuda was an investor in a group of Panda Express restaurants in Chicago. The restaurants were owned by a joint venture, RC Partnership, made up of Panda Express Inc. and Rezko Concessions Inc. Massuda invested $4 million in the joint venture in exchange for an ownership interest of 11% in the joint venture. The joint venture also owned and controlled PE Chicago, a Delaware LLC. By the year 2001, the value of the RC Partnership was estimated to be $56.4 million.

By 2005, Rezko Concessions’ owner, Tony Rezko, was in deep financial and legal trouble. In April 2006, Massuda went to Panda and informed it of her intent to sue Rezko and asked whether Panda would be interested in buying her 11% share. Panda’s general counsel declined the offer and instead told Massuda that her stake was worthless.

In mid-May 2006, Rezko was urgently in need of money. In order to secure funds, Rezko offered to sell PE Chicago’s interest in RC Partnership to Panda. Panda agreed to pay Rezko $3 million, keep the deal between them secret and grant Rezko personally a buy-back option.

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The Illinois Appellate Court has reversed and remanded a decision by a Cook County Circuit Judge relating to a sale agreement for a condominium purchase. In November 2010, the Habitat Co., the Gautreaux Development Manager for the Chicago Housing Authority, signed a purchase and sale agreement with Tera Healy to buy her condominium for $250,000. The contract was contingent on Habitat and Healy getting final approval from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and Healy’s lender approving a short payoff.

These approvals were met, but the 3721-3723 Elston Condominium Association intervened, exercising its right of first refusal and purchased Healy’s condominium. The housing authority filed a lawsuit against the association, charging it with tortious interference of contract and breach of contract, seeking specific performance: the sale of the condominium.

The authority argued that the contract between Habitat and Healy was valid and binding. Moreover, the authority argued that the association did not have the right of first refusal contained in any of its declarations or bylaws, but nonetheless attempted to exercise this right.

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Shuffle Tech made automatic card-shuffling equipment for the consumer market and particularly for casinos. In 2010, Shuffle Tech and Wolff Gaming, a distributor of the equipment, signed a letter of intent that expressed their mutual commitment to proceed with a draft agreement regarding product development and distribution.

The agreement laid out a deal in which Shuffle Tech and Wolff Gaming would collaborate to develop a casino-grade shuffling machine. In return for providing financial assistance, Wolff would become the exclusive equipment distributor in the Western Hemisphere.

The next year, but before the new equipment was developed, Shuffle Tech wrote to Wolff proposing that the companies part ways and settle all outstanding business. Several months later, Shuffle Tech filed a lawsuit in the federal court seeking a declaratory judgment that the draft agreement was not an enforceable contract, that the letter of intent was enforceable and that Wolff had broken the letter of intent agreement.

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According to the Illinois Appellate Court, a corporate condominium association that was dissolved is in a legal standing the same as that of a dead natural person such as found in the case of Markus v. Chicago Title & Trust, 373 Ill.557 (1940).

Under Illinois §12.80 of the Business Corporation Act of 1983, a five-year window is open for suing a corporation on any claim that existed or liability that was incurred before the dissolution of the company.

In this particular case, the issue was whether (a) two subcontractors who are dissolved and allegedly botched work on a condominium project and (b) the general contractor who wasn’t sued by the condominium association until more than five years after the subcontractors closed shop. Does §12.80 block the general contractor from filing an indemnification, contribution claim against the defunct contractors, or do “equitable considerations” extend the deadline?

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In a case involving a default judgment in the amount of $421,582 against an Illinois corporation, Mama Gramm’s Bakery requested that a Cook County judge pierce the corporate veil of Silver Fox Pastry and put the liability on Haitham Abuzir. Abuzir was never a director, officer, shareholder or employee of the corporation, Silver Fox.

In the attempt to pierce the veil, Mama Gramm’s alleged that Abuzir funded Silver Fox, “made all business decisions” and “exercised ownership control over the corporation to such a degree that separate personalities of the corporation and defendant did not exist.” The trial judge dismissed the complaint for failing to state a cause of action against Abuzir. The Illinois Appellate court reversed that decision and provided an opinion on the issue of “whether the veil may be pierced to reach non-shareholders.”

The underlying case that resulted in a default judgment was a trade secret case. The appellate court discussed the ways to create and organize a sham corporation. “In some instances, the wrongdoer neither holds stock nor serves in an official capacity. Making officer, director or shareholder status a pre-requisite to veil-piercing elevates form over substance and is therefore contrary to veil-piercing’s equitable nature.”

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