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The plaintiff, Stephan Urbaniak,was prescribed and took a drug called Reglan for six years. He developed severe movement disorders. The prescribing physician, Dr. John Ross, admits that he was unaware of the risk of developing these movement disorders from long-term use of this prescription drug.

By operation of the “learned intermediary doctrine,” the pharmacy cannot be held liable for choosing not to verbally warn the plaintiff or his physician about the medical risks associated with long-term use of Reglan.

There is no specific reason that the pharmacy could have known about that, which would have made plaintiff specifically someone who could not be treated with Reglan longer than 12 weeks.
Accordingly, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal of the lawsuit against the pharmacy and physician.
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After Ernestine Wilson’s 23-year-old son Brian Curry died from a saddle pulmonary embolism (a blood clot that blocked the large pulmonary artery straddling his lungs), she sued emergency room physician Dr. Eric Moon and Chicago’s St. Bernard Hospital. She claimed that the doctor was negligent in choosing not to diagnose and treat her son’s condition and that the hospital was also liable because of its principal-agent relationship with the doctor. Dr. Moon denied negligence and the hospital moved for summary judgment on the ground that the doctor was an independent contractor.

Wilson reached a settlement with the hospital, but at the trial six weeks later, the doctor called the hospital’s retained expert in pulmonary medicine. The witness testified that Brian’s signs and symptoms did not suggest pulmonary embolism and that what subsequently occurred was a sudden and unsurvivable medical condition regardless of the doctor’s efforts.

Dr. Moon generally adopted the hospital’s expert opinions and thus was not required to submit a second 213(f)(3) disclosure containing all of the same information of an earlier disclosure once the hospital settled with Wilson for the plaintiff.
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In August 2013, Alexis Dameron underwent surgery at Mercy Hospital and Medical Center where she claimed to have sustained injuries due to medical negligence. She filed a medical malpractice case against Mercy and various employees at the hospital on Nov. 6, 2014.

During discovery, she disclosed that Dr. David Preston would be testifying as an expert witness, presenting evidence drawn from an electromyogram and EMG study yet to be performed. The EMG was to take place on June 1, 2017, but Dr. Preston’s report was not included in the record.

Dameron moved to designate Dr. Preston a “nontestifying expert consultant,” stating that Dr. Preston’s designation as a testifying expert witness had been “inadvertent.”
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This interlocutory appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court was dismissed. A supervisory order was entered remanding the case back to the trial court.

The plaintiff in this case filed a wrongful death and survival action lawsuit alleging medical malpractice of the defendant Union Health Service. The defendant alleged immunity under Section 26 of the Voluntary Health Services Plans Act. The Circuit Court of Cook County judge denied defendant’s Section 2-619 motion on the grounds that a 1988 amendment to Section 26 is unconstitutional.

The denial of the motion to dismiss is an interlocutory ruling, and it was found not to be subject to review by the Supreme Court under Rule 302(a)(1).
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This case arises out of a medical malpractice lawsuit alleged to have been prompted by the negligence of a radiologist. Courtney Webster had a CT scan performed at CDI Indiana LLC‘s diagnostic imaging facility. The radiologist, an independent contractor hired by Medical Scanning Consultants, missed identifying and diagnosing the cancer, which then remained untreated for over a year before being diagnosed.

Webster and her husband, Brian Webster, sued CDI, which in turn insisted that the Websters could not hold it liable because CDI did not directly employ the radiologist who was at fault for not recognizing the cancer.

The district court rejected that argument and applied the law of apparent agency, which instructs that a medical provider is liable if a patient reasonably relied on its apparent authority over the wrongdoer.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit of Chicago held that a prior acts exclusion under an insurance policy issued by a professional liability insurer to a medical-practice insurer excluded coverage. The exclusion was ruled legal only if the medical-malpractice insurer committed an actual wrongful act, not just if it was accused of committing such an act.

MedPro, the insured medical malpractice carrier in this case, was represented by Clyde & Co., LLP of Washington, D.C. The professional liability insurer was American International Specialty Lines Insurance Co. (AISLIC).

MedPro issued medical-malpractice coverage to Dr. Benny Phillips, subject to a $200,000 liability limit.
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Faith DeGrand was just 10 when she was diagnosed with congenital scoliosis. To try to prevent the condition from worsening, Faith underwent surgery by a pediatric orthopedist, Dr. Eric Jones. In this surgery, Dr. Jones inserted hardware in Faith’s thoracic spine.

After this surgery, Faith experienced incontinence, numbness in her hands and fingers, and weakness in both legs. Dr. Jones examined Faith, but found nothing wrong. Another doctor took over Faith’s care after Dr. Jones went on vacation.

Faith’s condition worsened. Dr. Jones then performed another surgery to loosen the hardware he had placed in Faith’s thoracic spine during the first surgery. Despite this effort, Faith’s symptoms worsened. Dr. Jones then went on another vacation. The other doctor, taking over Faith’s medical care, ordered an MRI. Faith underwent yet another surgery, this time to remove the hardware, which had led to decreased blood flow to and indirect compression of her cervical spine.
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Ms. Doe, 47 years old, suffered from multiple sclerosis and used a walker. After visiting an urgent care clinic, she became tired and tried to sit down on her walker. The walker flipped over and Ms. Doe hit her head on the pavement. A physician’s assistant at the clinic palpated the injury and stitched Ms. Doe’s wound before discharging her with verbal instructions.

Ms. Doe fell into a coma approximately five hours later. She was taken by ambulance to a hospital where testing revealed a skull fracture and intracranial hemorrhage with midline shift. Despite undergoing neurosurgery, Ms. Doe now suffers from severe cognitive issues and requires 24-hour-per-day care.

Ms. Doe sued the urgent care clinic, alleging that it chose not to transfer her to a hospital emergency room after the fall in light of her neurological symptoms, including one-sided weakness. The lawsuit also alleged that the urgent care clinic should have sent Ms. Doe home with written, not verbal instructions.
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In the wrongful death case for Lee Lindemann, filed on behalf of the Estate of Sue Ann Lindemann, the U.S. District Court ruled that estoppel blocked National Fire & Marine Insurance Co. from invoking a “declining balance” provision in its insurance policy. The insurance company asked for a reduction from its $1 million liability limit to $600,000 by subtracting the $400,000 National paid for the defense expenses during two years of litigation.

National’s policy covered Dr. Erick Falconer in this wrongful death case and another defendant, Western Healthcare. In May 2013, the answer that Falconer’s attorney submitted to “Interrogatory 9” said he was insured under a National policy that had a $1 million liability limit.

But when responding to her request for a copy of the insurance policy, Dr. Falconer’s attorneys reportedly took the shortcut of referring back to this interrogatory answer. This maneuver meant that the litigants didn’t see the policy provision that ordinarily would have reduced the liability limit by the amount of defense expenditures.
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Jodi Hall sued Dr. Roberto P. Cippola for medical malpractice, claiming that he had violated the applicable standard of care by not referring Jason Hall, Jodi’s husband, to a hospital emergency room. Jason had gone to St. Joseph’s PromptCare complaining of chest pain.

The receptionist at the urgent care center asked Jason to describe his symptoms. Her notes said: “Left upper chest pain, was moving a lot of metal today, ‘cramping in neck and arms sometimes.'”

The applicable standard of care called for sending a patient to the emergency room if his chest pain was “suspected to be of cardiac origin.”
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